The Major League Baseball landscape at the quarter pole

The baseball season is roughly 25% complete and a good amount of separation has taken place between the good teams, the not so good teams, and the Houston Astros and Miami Marlins.  It is a fact that the mainstream statistic with the highest correlation to runs scored and allowed is total bases (TB) , with nearly a .93 correlation to runs scored over the past ten years.  A team’s total base sum is calculated as follows: (singles x1) + (doubles x2) + (triples x3) +(home runs x4).  The total base figure completely excludes a team’s ability to draw bases on balls, a statistic unto itself that does not correlate highly with scoring runs.  The total base correlation mentioned prior surpasses saber metric standard-bearers on base percentage (OBP) and slugging percentage (SLG) in its ability to predict a team’s run totals offensively and defensively for at least the last decade.  While it is so that there are strong similarities as to how total bases and these two subsequent figures are calculated, a marked improvement it is nonetheless.  With this, I’ve presented a graphic above with every major league team’s league-wide ranking in crucial areas including runs scored (RF) , total bases for (TBF) , runs allowed (RA) , and total bases allowed (TBA) and given the ranking for all four categories to the immediate right of each.  In addition, I’ve created columns displaying every team’s differential in terms of runs (R DIF) and total bases (TB DIF) with positive values indicating more runs or total bases tallied for than against.  League rankings have been given for these as well.

While it seems far-fetched to think of the Chicago Cubs as an above average team much less significantly better than division rival Cincinnati, don’t be shocked to see the two National League Central foes switch places in the standings in the coming months if their current levels of play continue.  Chicago’s national league version has scored significantly fewer runs than their total base figure indicates they should have by this point in the still young season.  In addition the Cubs have allowed proportionately more runs than would normally be the case given their total bases allowed. North-side fans can take heart in the substantial improvement their young team has made on the field and can rest assured, based upon their total base figures both offensively and defensively, that much better days lie ahead.  Not that they’ve ever heard that line before.

How good of a quarterback prospect is Geno Smith?

The 2013 NFL Draft quarterback class is considered void of blue-chip talent by any and all draft experts. Headline names like Geno Smith and Matt Barkley have been picked apart and scrutinized from almost every angle possible regarding criteria such as work ethic, leadership skills, decision-making, and throwing accuracy. After listening to countless television and radio personalities make definitive statements on players they may or may not have actually studied in depth, I decided to take a closer look at most of the quarterbacks of the past several seasons who were either drafted, projected to be drafted, or that I took a particular interest in such as Penn State’s Matt McGloin.

Focusing solely on each quarterback’s third down throwing performance in college, a couple of things about these prospects perceived to be cloudy and uncertain becomes rather clear and very much tangible. I measured every player on their ability to successfully complete the objective on third down pass attempts, that being the play resulting in either a touchdown or a first down.  This metric, while not perfect by any means,  accomplishes the task of putting college football players in similar environments which can be difficult due to the disparities that exist in quality of opponent and style of play.  Third down pass attempt performance does a good job of getting the quarterback out of their comfort zone and allows for clear-cut parameters to be set up: did you succeed or fail in your attempt to gain a first down or touchdown?

The most important column in the graphic below is “WT_SR%” (third from right) which is the success rate on third down of all the quarterbacks listed in the leftmost column.  The “WT_+/-%” column (second from right) is the value above or below the average success rate of all players evaluated.  Data for this post is courtesy of cfbstats.com and sportsreference.com.

2013 NFL Draft QB Class

If the Buffalo Bills wanted a quarterback from this year’s class, they very well may have picked the right one in E.J. Manuel. The “WT_SR%” column I mentioned previously shows the success rate on third down for each player in their collegiate career.  The column to the immediate right is the percentage above or below average relative to the 38 quarterbacks observed for this piece.  The best value in the draft may be Landry Jones, a four-year starter at Oklahoma who showed significant improvement in his senior year.  As you can see in the subsequent data, this fits the Colin Kaepernick progression model with both players being four year starters who improved exponentially in their senior campaigns.  The complete table for most of the notable quarterbacks eligible for the draft from 2008 through next year’s projected class immediately follows this paragraph.  Feel free to play around with the 3 data tables found below.  The sheet #1 table shows all data compiled for this project.  Sheet#2 is a more complete version of sheet#3, which features each quarterback’s performance for each of their seasons as the primary starter for their respective college teams.  I’ve also included on sheet#2 the NFL winning percentage in games started and DVOA (percentage value above or below average) for all players with at least a handful of professional games started.  The default screen shown is sheet#3 and is sorted by the highest overall success rate measured, belonging to 2014 NFL Draft – eligible Johnny Manziel of Texas A&M.

Of the 21 quarterbacks on the list who have started at least a handful of games in the NFL, 12 performed similarly in the pros as they did in college.  Russell Wilson, who was significantly undervalued throughout the 2012 NFL Draft process, had the single best season observed of any quarterback in 2011 with Wisconsin.  Outside of Robert Griffin’s poor outlying performance on the above list, sorted best to worst total collegiate success rate, the bottom half of the table does a good job of identifying disastrous NFL prospects including Blaine Gabbert, Jimmy Clausen, and Ryan Lindley.  This does not bode well for NFL hopefuls Matt McGloin, Tyler Bray, and Tyler Wilson.  One wonders why college standouts like Sam Bradford and Colt McCoy have fared not so well in the professional ranks to this point.

Football Coach Rater 1.0 (Part 1)

Then Chiefs head coach Romeo Crennel and Falcons head coach Mike Smith.

Think of this entry as a starting point in attempting to measure the seemingly intangible abilities of all football coaches, with “intangible” being the very things which would set them apart from each other if all were dealt the same hand in terms of the talent level of their players.  In other words, which coaches get the best results on the scoreboard given what they have to work with season after season…and which coaches don’t.  All data is courtesy of sportsreference.com.

Methodology

The formula I created for measuring NFL head coaches is broken down into two main components:

  • Team SRS Rating
  • Team Net Yards Gained per Play (adjusted for strength of schedule)

The team SRS (simple ratings system) rating will tell us how well a team performs and by definition is a team’s average margin of victory over a presumably average opponent. It is preferable to team won-loss record for this exercise due to the misleading win totals, for better or worse, that can occur in brief 16 game seasons.  The 2004 Atlanta falcons, for instance, went 11-5 during a regular season in which they outscored their opponents by a total of 3 points and posted a below average SRS rating of -2.2.  The point differential and SRS rating are indicative of a 7 or 8 win team which given a league average schedule and one or two fewer made field goals would have been the case.  To clarify the meaning of the SRS rating take the best team measured in this study, the 2007 New England Patriots, who outscored the average team (SRS rating of 0) by 20.1 points per game and had an SRS rating of 20.1.  The worst team observed was the 2009 St. Louis Rams, who were outscored by Joe Average NFL team by 17.4 points per game for an SRS rating of -17.4.

A team’s net yards per play will be used to determine the talent level of each individual team and is calculated simply enough by subtracting their average yards allowed per play defensively from their yards gained per play offensively.  The best team over the past ten NFL seasons in this respect was the 2010 San Diego Chargers at +1.5 yards per play while the worst was the infamous 2008 Detroit Lions at -1.7 yards per play.  In order to strengthen the correlation between team SRS rating and Net Yards per Play,  I adjusted the “Net Yards” factor for each team’s strength of schedule.  For instance, observe the 2012 San Francisco 49ers adjusted net yards:

Year     Team       Coach              A           B           C                D           E              F

2012 SANF Harbaugh, Jim 6 4.7 1.3 2.5 0.25 1.55

The 49er’s net yards per play is represented by A-B = C.  Column D is the strength of schedule component with a positive value representing an above average strength of schedule.  In this instance, I am going to increase the 49er’s Column C total  to reflect how they would have fared per play against an average opponent with a column D value of 0.  This new value representing adjusted yards per play is found in column F.  I used one tenth of the schedule strength component, represented by column E, due to it leading to the strongest correlation between SRS rating (not shown in the above example) and Net Yards/Play.  In other words, it most effectively extracted both of the main components out of our final objective of a truly “intangible” rating for all coaches.  This calculation, which represents the entire denominator in our final coach rating, is equivalent to… (A-B) + (D/10).  That’s all there is to it.

Now that the makeup of the denominator has been established, the complete evaluation of NFL coaches can be established as follows:

                                          SRS Rating / Net Yards Per Play

The final step is to figure the best way to represent the two components as to give the proper emphasis to each one.  I did this by scaling all the individual SRS values (320 in all) from .200 to .800 with .200 representing those pitiful 2009 St. Louis Rams mentioned above and .800 representing the 2007 Patriots.  The same idea is behind the scaling of the Net Yards per Play values from .300 to .700.  In this case the worst value of .302 belongs to the 2009 Cleveland Browns and best value of .700 belongs to the 2012 San Francisco 49ers.  I adjusted the final value so that an average coach would have a rating of precisely 1.  With the heavy lifting done we can review the results from the last ten NFL seasons.  The list is sorted by each coach’s percentage above or below the average rating, with the highest rated individual, the Falcon’s Mike Smith, listed first.  I’ve also supplied the number of seasons of data for each coach that were included in this piece.

Coach Name Coach Rating Percent Value Yrs
Mike Smith 1.49 48.7% 5
Jim Harbaugh 1.42 41.7% 2
Bill Belichick 1.36 35.1% 11
Joe Vitt 1.28 27.4% 1
Lovie Smith 1.25 24.2% 9
Dick Vermeil 1.21 20.4% 4
John Harbaugh 1.20 19.5% 5
Tony Dungy 1.15 14.3% 7
Tony Sparano 1.13 12.9% 4
Mike McCarthy 1.13 12.6% 7
Sean Payton 1.11 10.4% 6
Dave Wannstedt 1.10 9.9% 3
Marvin Lewis 1.09 9.0% 10
Marty Schottenheimer 1.09 8.9% 5
Bill Callahan 1.08 7.8% 2
Brian Billick 1.08 7.6% 6
Chuck Pagano 1.08 7.3% 1
Pete Carroll 1.08 7.1% 3
Eric Mangini 1.08 7.1% 5
Greg Schiano 1.07 6.5% 1
Rex Ryan 1.06 5.9% 4
Mike Holmgren 1.06 5.5% 7
Bill Cowher 1.05 4.9% 5
Tom Coughlin 1.05 4.1% 10
Norv Turner 1.03 2.4% 8
Jack Del Rio 1.03 2.3% 9
Jeff Fisher 1.02 1.7% 10
Jim Mora, Jr. 1.02 1.6% 6
Mike Philbin 1.02 1.1% 1
Dick Jauron 1.01 0.9% 6
Mike Sherman 1.01 0.9% 4
Joe Gibbs 1.01 0.4% 4
Mike Tomlin 1.01 0.2% 6
Brad Childress 1.00 -0.5% 5
Andy Reid 0.98 -2.1% 11
Jason Garrett 0.98 -2.3% 2
Wade Phillips 0.98 -2.4% 4
Jim Haslett 0.98 -2.5% 4
Jim Schwartz 0.97 -3.7% 4
Gary Kubiak 0.97 -3.9% 7
Bill Parcells 0.96 -4.4% 4
Mike Singletary 0.95 -4.9% 2
Mike Shanahan 0.95 -5.5% 10
Chan Gailey 0.95 -5.7% 3
Butch Davis 0.94 -5.9% 3
Jon Gruden 0.94 -6.5% 8
Herman Edwards 0.93 -6.9% 8
Jon Fox 0.93 -7.0% 11
Dom Capers 0.93 -7.7% 4
Mike Tice 0.92 -8.3% 4
Mike Martz 0.92 -8.4% 5
Jim Caldwell 0.92 -8.6% 3
Leslie Frazier 0.91 -9.2% 2
Steve Mariucci 0.91 -9.5% 4
Mike Mularkey 0.91 -9.5% 3
Ken Wisenhunt 0.90 -10.6% 6
Ron Rivera 0.89 -11.6% 2
Todd Haley 0.88 -12.2% 2
Pat Schurmur 0.87 -13.2% 2
Greg Williams 0.87 -13.5% 2
Tom Cable 0.87 -13.6% 2
Romeo Crennel 0.86 -13.9% 5
Nick Saban 0.86 -14.6% 2
Lane Kiffin 0.85 -15.2% 2
Dennis Green 0.85 -15.3% 3
Raheem Morris 0.83 -17.6% 2
Dennis Erickson 0.82 -18.7% 2
Mike Munchak 0.80 -20.6% 2
Steve Spurrier 0.79 -21.4% 2
Josh McDaniels 0.79 -21.4% 2
Jim Zorn 0.78 -22.6% 2
Jim Fassel 0.77 -22.9% 2
Steve Spagnuolo 0.76 -24.3% 3
Marty Mornhinweg 0.75 -25.7% 1
Cam Cameron 0.74 -26.4% 1
Rod Marinelli 0.73 -27.4% 3
Al McGinnis 0.71 -29.3% 2
Mike Nolan 0.71 -29.7% 4
Dave Campo 0.68 -31.9% 1
Scott Linehan 0.67 -33.1% 2
Bobby Petrino 0.65 -35.4% 1
Hue Jackson 0.63 -37.5% 1
Dennis Allen 0.62 -38.4% 1
Art Shell 0.61 -39.0% 1
Dick LeBeau 0.61 -39.4% 1

 

Keeping Pace in the NCAA Tournament

Indiana University's head basketball coach Tom Crean.

Indiana University’s head basketball coach Tom Crean.

Every March the first week of the NCAA basketball tournament seems to provide a higher frequency of exhilarating end of game scenarios and buzzer-beating finishes than the subsequent two weeks combined.  While this level of excitement can swell to levels not seen elsewhere in the realm of competitive sport, mixed in amongst the classic endings are a healthy dose of lopsided match ups where heavy favorites take it to their significantly weaker opponents.  With that in mind this post will focus on the tournament games which take place after this initial flurry of dust has settled, emotions have simmered down, the competitive landscape has leveled off,  and only 16 teams remain.

Thanks to the content of two great web sites, kenpom.com and sportsreference.com, I was able to look at the last ten seasons of college basketball data and try to create a profile for what a successful tournament team looks like in terms of their offensive efficiency, defensive efficiency, and pace of play.  Offensive and defensive proficiency is simply the number of points a team scores and allows every 100 possessions adjusted for strength of schedule.  The team’s pace of play, or tempo, is the number of possessions that team averages per game played.  This is useful to determine stylistically if a squad prefers to play more up-tempo or more of a half-court slow-down.  For this study I did not focus on the raw numbers of points and possessions but rather the national ranking of every team in order to create a level playing field when comparing teams from different seasons.  The team rankings referenced here can range from 1 (indicating leading the nation in a given category) to 347 (the number of Division 1 basketball teams eligible for the 2013 NCAA Tournament).  For starters, here is the average ranking in offensive efficiency, defensive efficiency, and pace of play (smaller number indicates higher tempo or pace)  for teams reaching designated areas of the sweet sixteen round of play and beyond.  The entire 2013 field presented graphically can be found here.

 

Level OVR Rank OFF Rank DEF Rank Tempo Rank
All Teams 15.5 23.0 27.1 159.8
Sweet 16 21.4 30.2 35.2 167.5
Elite 8 11.1 15.9 22.3 146.1
Final 4 21.4 30.2 35.2 167.5
Final 2 8.4 20.9 10.5 176.4
Champ 2.7 4.1 9.0 121.0

This table represents data from 150 tournament games dating back to the 2002-2003 season.  The “level” column found on the left indicates the round in which a given team was eliminated with the rest of that row providing the average rankings for those teams.  The “OVR Rank” column gives the team’s national overall efficiency which is simply a synthesis of the offensive and defensive ratings.  Note the significant jump in offensive efficiency relative to the jump in to defensive efficiency in identifying national champions as opposed to national runner-ups.

Focusing solely on pace of play for a moment leads to this graph which illustrates where all 160 teams ranked in tempo (again, lower number equals higher tempo) and how many games they were able to win (0-4) once reaching the round of 16.  The results seem very much symmetrical with a slight lean to the left (faster tempo) highlighted the two upper-leftmost circles representing both of North Carolina’s national championship teams in the last decade.

The pace of play, or tempo, for every sweet sixteen team the last 10 seasons measured against their level of success in the tournament.  The numbers on the y-axis represent the number of games won after reaching the round of 16 with 4 wins equating to a national championship.

The pace of play, or tempo, for every sweet sixteen team the last 10 seasons measured against their level of success in the tournament. The numbers on the y-axis represent the number of games won after reaching the round of 16 with 4 wins equating to a national championship.

While a quick glance at this may cause one to dismiss the correlation between playing at a quicker pace and advancing in the tournament, a closer look at the “4 win” line shows a point of no return represented by Duke’s 2010 squad.  Their pace rank of 249 (out of 347 teams) in that championship run is statistically less than one standard deviation below the mean while aforementioned North Carolina secured a pair of titles playing at break-neck paces of 8th and 9th nationally, closer to the extreme edge of the bell curve (roughly 3 standard deviation above average).  This last point may be trying to make too much out of a data set of this size, but it is fact that a significant group of perceived national title contenders this season, namely Florida, Wisconsin, Georgetown, and Pittsburgh rank well below this established “249″ pace threshold of sorts.  Lets take a quick look at a breakdown of every Sweet 16 team in the past decade and their overall ranking, pace ranking, and winning %:

Team Pace Rank OVR Rank Winning %
Faster than Average 14.5 0.513
Slower than Average 16.4 0.487

Not much there, especially considering the slightly better team ranking of the more victorious group.  How about the fastest 10% versus the slowest 10%:

Team Pace Rank OVR Rank Winning %
Fastest 10% 12.7 0.516
Slowest 10% 17.9 0.200

Significantly more revealing stuff here.  While the two groups possess comparable albeit uneven average team overall rankings, a great disparity exists in their ability to win from the round of 16 and on.  Even if we remove the two North Carolina national championship teams from the fast group (both squads had a OVR Rank of 1), the average winning % (.367) is still nearly 2 times greater than the slow group.  So what does this all mean in regards to the 2013 NCAA Tournament?  You can cross these teams off your “potential national champions” list:

Team OVR Rk Pace RK
Pittsburgh 8 7 339
Notre Dame 7 31 320
Georgetown 2 12 313
Wisconsin 5 9 310
Florida 3 1 299
Kansas St. 4 30 293

Some very good teams here, but all fall in the bottom 10% of team pace for this year’s tourney field.  No one in the bottom 10% of all teams in terms of pace has made it to a championship game much less won the final game in the past decade.  A common thread amongst these “slow” teams both historically and this year would seem to be a lack of blue-chip talent on their rosters, with the intention to shorten the game as frequently as possible as a way of masking this fact.  It may be that the lack of individual talent makes it more difficult to get a quality shot off in a shorter period of time.  Even presumed pro factory Florida, a member of the above group, does not have a current player projected to go in the first round of the upcoming 2013 NBA Draft (to be fair, Georgetown does).

So who are the true national title contenders this season?  Based on all the data observed a team must fit into all of the groups below:

  • Top 20 Overall team Ranking
  • Top 20 Offensive Efficiency Ranking
  • Top 30 Defensive Efficiency Ranking
  • Top 90% of all teams in Pace Ranking

These qualifications leave us with the following list:

Team OVR Rank OFF Rank DEF Rank PACE Rk
Louisville 2 15 1 112
Indiana 3 1 19 86
Gonzaga 4 3 14 231
Ohio St. 5 14 6 248
Duke 6 4 25 81
Syracuse 13 16 23 235
Miami FL 14 20 22 282
AVG CHAMP 2.7 4.1 9 121

The following somewhat crude exercise leaves us with these “profile scores” when comparing the 7 current contenders to the historically average champion:

Team OVR Rank OFF Rank DEF Rank PACE Rk Total +/-
Indiana 0.3 -3.1 10 -35 -27.8
Duke 3.3 -0.1 16 -40 -20.8
Louisville -0.7 10.9 -8 -9 -6.8
Gonzaga 1.3 -1.1 5 110 115.2
Ohio St. 2.3 9.9 -3 127 136.2
Syracuse 10.3 11.9 14 114 150.2
Miami FL 11.3 15.9 13 161 201.2
AvgChange 4.0 6.3 6.7 61.1  78.2

I looked at the total number of ranking spots the seven teams were removed from the average champion and found Lousiville to be the closest match, only 6.8 spots removed from the profile.  Miami finishes a distant 7th, over 200 spots removed from the aggregate.  Discounting Pace ranking completely would make Louisville and Indiana virtual co- favorites, although as we’ve discussed doing so may not be the wisest move.  Personally, I like Indiana’s combination of high-tempo offense and blue-chip talent to be there at the end.

Why the Philadelphia Flyers Fail to Win the Stanley Cup

Devils defenseman Scott Stevens and Flyers center Eric Lindros.

Few NHL teams have enjoyed the level of regular season success over the past 20 years or so that the Philadelphia Flyers have.  Since the league expanded to 26 teams for the 1993-1994 season, only 3 franchises have missed the playoffs in 2 or fewer seasons; Philadelphia, New Jersey, and Detroit.  These three have combined to fill out 13 of the 36 possible slots in the Stanley Cup Finals in this time period and show few signs of slowing down in terms of consistently putting a quality product on the ice.  With this being established, why have the Devils and Red Wings won a total of 7 championships in this time period while perennial contender Philadelphia has essentially nothing to show for their performance?  Delving into some relatively simple data reveals everything one needs to know.

In attempting to get a handle on the identity of an NHL team, it doesn’t get much more basic than looking at where that team ranks league-wide in goals scored and allowed in a given season.  How these rankings are achieved throughout the season may encompass enumerable factors which I will not get into the specifics of in this piece.  Where does the typical playoff team rank in these two categories?  Do teams that rank significantly higher in either of the two categories tend to advance further than lower-ranking teams?  These are the kinds of questions I set out to find answers to and, for the most part, was able to track down.  Lets first look at the average league rankings in terms of goals scored (GF) and goals allowed (GA) for every playoff team from the 1993-1994 season through the 2011-2012 campaign.  The data has been broken down to display the identity of teams as they are able to advance round by round in the 16-team tournament.  The lower the number, the better the team’s ranking in the two categories.  For instance, a ranking of 1 in the GF category indicates a team that led the league in goals scored offensively.  Keep in mind the league expanded to 26 teams for the initial season observed and subsequently increased to the current number of 30.  All data analyzed for this post can be found at www.hockey-reference.com.

While there doesn’t seem to be much difference between the run-of-the-mill playoff team (WON 0) and teams that fall short in the Stanley Cup Finals (WON 3), there is a clear gap between teams that hoist the trophy and the rest of the pack.  More specifically, goals allowed (GA) seems to be a more telling figure when it comes to a team’s ability to win the cup than goals scored.  This was never more evident than this past season when the Los Angeles Kings, ranking 29th in goals scored and 2nd in goals allowed during the regular season rose from the ashes of an eigth seed in the western conference and won it all.

So, how does this trace back to our case study, Philadelphia?  Lets look at the Flyer’s average ranking in the two categories since the 1993-1994 season relative to the other two model franchises, New Jersey and Detroit.

  • TEAM                 GF         GA        TOTAL
  • Flyers                  8.2        11.6          19.8
  • Devils                14.7          4.0          18.7
  • Red Wings          3.7          7.6          11.3

While the Red Wings have been on average a more well-rounded and dominant team than New Jersey and Philadelphia, the Flyers and Devils have been very comparable in terms of combining the rankings in the two categories with Philadelphia being the better offensive club and poorer defensively.  The clear distinction between the two teams that have combined to win 7 cups in the last 18 seasons and perennial bridesmaid Philadelphia is their ability and, perhaps more appropriately, their emphasis as a team on not allowing goals.  While the Flyers have had seasons where they ranked at or near the top of the league in preventing goals these past 18 seasons, it has not occurred consistently enough in order to give themselves enough legitimate opportunities to win their first NHL title since 1975.